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Abstract
Political polarization at the elite level is a major concern in many contemporary democracies, which is argued to alienate large swaths of the electorate
and prevent meaningful social change from occurring, yet little is known about
how individuals respond to political candidates who deviate from the party line
and express policy positions incongruent with their party affiliations. This experiment examines the neural underpinnings of such evaluations using functional MRI (fMRI). During fMRI, participants completed an experimental task
where they evaluated policy positions attributed to hypothetical political candidates. Each block of trials focused on one candidate (Democrat or Republican), but all participants saw two candidates from each party in a randomized
order. On each trial, participants received information about whether the candidate supported or opposed a specific policy issue. These issue positions varied in terms of congruence between issue position and candidate party affiliation. We modeled neural activity as a function of incongruence and whether
participants were viewing ingroup or outgroup party candidates. Results suggest that neural activity in brain regions previously implicated in both evaluative processing and work on ideological differences (insula and anterior cingulate cortex) differed as a function of the interaction between incongruence,
candidate type (ingroup versus outgroup), and political ideology. More liberal
participants showed greater activation to incongruent versus congruent trials
in insula and ACC, primarily when viewing ingroup candidates. Implications
for the study of democratic representation and linkages between citizens’ calls
for social change and policy implementation are discussed.
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I could never toe the party line. I’d wear out the carpet crossing the floor.
– Hazel McCallion, former mayor of Mississauga, Ontario

Introduction
Representation is the crucial link between citizens’ calls for social change and
actual policy change, and a key element of ensuring representation in any democratic system is the ability of citizens to elect and monitor public officials
who align with their views on major political issues so that policies can be implemented that represent the diverse preferences of the public. However, political parties are often pressured to appeal to their base in such a way that
elected officials are encouraged to constrain their policy positions and “toe the
party line”—i.e., to follow the ideals and policy preferences of their political
party (and its more extreme members) rather than their often more moderate constituency. Political parties desire to distinguish themselves from other
parties by highlighting these differences, which only increases the likelihood
of gridlock (Binder, 2003; Haas, 2016; Mondak & Mitchell, 2008). In a twoparty system such as that of the USA, this can lead to unprecedented levels
of political polarization and alienation of large swaths of the electorate (see,
e.g., Masket, 2009; McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2006; Sinclair, 2006; Theriault, 2008). Polarization in political elites and a divided government slows
down government productivity through political gridlock (Binder, 2003; Edwards III, Barrett, & Peake, 1997), which in turn slows down social change.
Thus, somewhat ironically, one of the major obstacles preventing meaningful
social change in US politics is the inability of elected officials to compromise
with political opponents from across the aisle.
In this paper, we address the question of how citizens actually respond to
an elected official who deviates from party-based expectations. In general,
trust in government and public satisfaction with the degree of representation
that exists in the USA are fairly low (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002; Pew Research Center, 2015), and an increasingly popular viewpoint is that the USA
should make it easier for third-party candidates or political “outsiders” to gain
traction in government (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002; Jones, 2014). However,
despite the public’s desire for increased representation, we do not fully understand how people respond to politicians who deviate from the party line, which
is a prerequisite for diminishing elite polarization and reducing the alienation
it yields. How do individuals react when a politician voices opinions that are
incongruent with his or her party affiliation? To what degree are incongruent
policy positions scrutinized by members of the public?
We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine how
neural activity in regions of the brain associated with evaluative processing differs when a candidate states policy positions that are either congruent
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or incongruent with what would normally be expected given the candidate’s
party affiliation. Neural activity in regions implicated in social judgment and
person perception has been shown to differ as a function of expectancy violations (e.g., Cloutier, Gabrieli, O’Young, & Ambady, 2011), and we sought to extend this work to regions of the brain implicated in attitudes and evaluative
processing of information, including the amygdala, insula, and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; see, e.g., Cunningham, Haas, & Jahn, 2011; Cunningham &
Zelazo, 2007; Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, & Van Bavel, 2007). We examine
the degree to which these brain regions were differentially activated for congruent versus incongruent policy statements in order to gauge when individuals were more likely to attend to deviations from party-based expectations.
Importantly, we also test for asymmetries in how people respond to these
deviations. First, it is possible that individuals respond differently to incongruence from members of their own party than to incongruence from members of
another party, as the attitudes literature suggests individuals are more likely
to engage in cognitive elaboration when information is personally relevant
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and neuroscience work has suggested that neural
processing in emotion-related regions (insula) and regions implicated in cognitive control (anterior cingulate, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) differ when
viewing photographs of ingroup versus outgroup party elites (Kaplan, Freedman, & Iacoboni, 2007). Second, we test for the possibility that incongruence
is processed differently between liberals and conservatives. A growing literature has examined psychological differences between individuals endorsing
right- or left-of-center beliefs, and mounting evidence suggests liberals and
conservatives differ in how they deal with ambiguity (Golec & Federico, 2004;
Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), monitor internal conflict (Amodio, Jost, Master, & Yee, 2007; Jost & Amodio, 2012), and manage cognitive
dissonance (Nam, Jost, & Van Bavel, 2013). In line with this work, we investigate how neural responses to incongruent policy statements differ between
liberals and conservatives.
The results of this study reflect a first step in identifying the mechanisms
underlying how individuals react to public officials deviating from expectations. Calls for increased representation and laments about polarization and
the alienation of average citizens are commonplace throughout contemporary
democracies, yet we do not have a detailed understanding of the social cognitive and neural processes underlying how individuals process and respond to
candidates who deviate from party stereotypes. Further, identifying asymmetries in how individuals respond to incongruent policy positions is essential
because if people respond to incongruence in ingroup candidates differently
than outgroup candidates, or if people from opposite ends of the ideological spectrum process incongruence differently, it suggests the electorate may
make deviating from the party line easier for some candidates than for others.
Partisan Cues and Evaluation of Incongruent Information
From the perspective of political psychology, the way that people process information about policy statements in relation to political candidates and groups
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can be understood in terms of social identity and partisan stereotypes (Green,
Palmquist, & Schickler, 2002; Greene, 1999; Huddy, Mason, & Aarøe, 2015;
Rahn, 1993). Stereotypes, including those related to political groups or identities, often serve as a cognitive heuristic that simplifies the political decisionmaking process by establishing expectations about preferred policy positions
based on group membership. Political scientists have demonstrated that voters often use partisan stereotypes and cues as a cognitive heuristic when evaluating political candidates and situations (e.g., Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Malhotra & Kuo, 2008). Party identification cues can be such a strong heuristic
that when politicians vote or support an issue across party lines, political sophisticates behave as though they are misinformed (Dancey & Sheagley, 2013)
and the general electorate from the respective party may show greater support
for the issue (Cohen, 2003; Nicholson, 2011). Deviation from reliance on stereotypes is likely to occur only in particular circumstances, such as when issues are salient, or for specific types of voters, such as those with more knowledge or information (Arceneaux, 2008).
Social psychological research has shown that stereotyping is largely an automatic cognitive process. Counterstereotypical or incongruent information is often ignored or assimilated to an existing stereotype, but the use of stereotypical
information is influenced by motivation (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996). People can
and sometimes do think more carefully about stereotype incongruent information or attitudinally incongruent information more generally, but only when it
has motivational significance or if they are predisposed to engage in more careful thinking. Contemporary attitude theory and research suggests that evaluative processing more generally is largely automatic, but influenced by context,
motivation, and goals (Cunningham et al., 2007; Fazio, 2007). Automatic evaluation involves processing in a number of subcortical regions implicated in emotion and affect, including amygdala and insula, whereas cortical regions such
as anterior cingulate, orbitofrontal cortex, and prefrontal cortex may help to
signal the need for engaging additional higher-order processing (Cunningham
et al., 2011; Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007; Cunningham et al., 2007). This work
has established a network of brain regions likely implicated in the evaluation
of information—regardless of the type of information encountered. Incongruent information, or events that violate expectations, is met with relatively automatic affective reactions in the amygdala and insula that are translated into
higher-order processing via the ACC, orbitofrontal cortex, and prefrontal cortex.
Much of the existing cognitive neuroscience work examining how people
respond to stereotypically incongruent information has focused on the domain of person perception, examining how people respond to individual exemplars who deviate from expectations. These tasks have shown that expectancy violations in person perception are associated with activation in regions
related to mentalizing, or simulating the minds of others (e.g., medial prefrontal cortex and temporoparietal junction) and more generally, regions associated with conflict detection and cognitive control (anterior cingulate and
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, e.g., Cloutier et al., 2011; Hehman, Ingbretsen,
& Freeman, 2014). It is worth noting here that expectancy violations are not
the only factor that influences the degree to which people engage in mentalizing, as other work has shown people are more likely to mentalize in relation
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to ingroup versus outgroup members (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006). This
suggests that people are likely to attend not only to whether or not information is incongruent with expectations, but also other aspects of the situation
such as the group membership of the evaluative target.
The aforementioned research can readily be applied to political attitudes.
Recent work in political neuroscience has begun to examine processes involved in political evaluation, such as political candidate perception and evaluation. Much of this work has presented participants with names or faces of
political candidates and found activation in many of the same brain regions
involved in evaluative processing more generally. For example, fMRI studies
have shown activation in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), insula, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) when people are evaluating disliked or opposition political candidates (Kaplan et al., 2007; Spezio et al., 2008). However, other fMRI work has shown that some of these regions also respond to
favored candidates (Tusche, Kahnt, Wisniewski, & Haynes, 2013), suggesting
that it may be premature to explain these effects purely on the basis of positive versus negative valence or liked versus disliked candidates. Many of these
brain regions are believed to serve multiple functions, and there is ongoing
debate about what the exact nature of function in these regions might be. For
example, the ACC has been implicated in cognitive control, conflict monitoring, and exploring alternative courses of action (e.g., Botvinick, 2007; Carter
et al., 1998; Kolling, Behrens, Wittmann, & Rushworth, 2016). Insula responds
to motivationally relevant information or salience and may aid in the process
of integrating cognitive with emotional information (Gu, Liu, Van Dam, Hof,
& Fan, 2013; Uddin, 2015), and there is also some evidence that activation in
these regions—insula and ACC—may be linked (Medford & Critchley, 2010).
Therefore, a limitation of the existing work in this area is that we do not
necessarily know what activation to candidate faces or names actually represents in terms of underlying cognitive processing or decision making, unless
participants are given a specific task to complete during fMRI where the nature of the decision is understood. In the present work, we focus mainly on
how people evaluate policy information. We use the context of candidate evaluation, but are less interested in how people are evaluating the candidates per
se, and more focused on how they are evaluating policy information associated
with those candidates. This allows us to examine the extent to which evaluative processing is impacted by incongruence. While existing work has begun
to explore the neural basis of political evaluation, we still have much to learn
about the mechanisms underlying this process and how evaluative processing
functions in the domain of politics.
Ideological Differences in Political Evaluation
Existing work in political psychology has argued that individuals with rightof-center ideological beliefs have stronger preferences for order and structure and more difficulty processing ambiguity than those with left-of-center
ideological beliefs (e.g., Golec & Federico, 2004; Jost et al., 2003, 2007). The
theory underlying this work is that conservatives seek to impose structure on
the world in order to manage negative emotions, and indeed, conservatism

6

Haas, Baker, & Gonzalez in Social Justice Research (2017)

has been correlated with a variety of survey measures examining this general
tendency across cultures (Atieh, Brief, & Vollrath, 1987; Chirumbolo, Areni, &
Sensales, 2004; Fay & Frese, 2000; Gillies & Campbell, 1985; Jost et al., 2003;
Kemmelmeier, 2007; Leone & Chirumbolo, 2008; Zavala, Golec, Cislak, & Wesolowska, 2010). With regard to brain differences, research has shown conservatives to have greater neural sensitivity to negative emotions (Ahn et al.,
2014) and less neural sensitivity to cues for altering habitual response patterns than liberals, suggesting that conservatism is associated with decreased
conflict monitoring compared to liberalism (Amodio et al., 2007). These findings have been corroborated by evidence that gray matter volume in the brain
regions associated with conflict monitoring (i.e., ACC) are greater in liberals
and gray matter volume in the brain regions associated with detecting emotional relevance (i.e., right amygdala) was greater in conservatives (Kanai,
Feilden, Firth, & Rees, 2011). Taken together, these findings suggest liberals
are more tolerant of ambiguity, but are also more likely to detect conflict and
adjust evaluations and behavior accordingly.
When it comes to evaluating political candidates, we expected ideological
asymmetries in conflict monitoring to manifest when people responded to candidates expressing policy positions incongruent with their party affiliation.
Given that, as explained earlier, party affiliations act largely as social identities and party labels cue people to infer policy positions about candidates, we
expected incongruent policy positions to reflect deviations from what is expected given party stereotypes. In general, incongruent policy positions should
trigger enhanced processing of political candidates because they should elicit
an affective response and activate conflict monitoring systems in the brain.
However, given the literature on ideological differences in conflict monitoring, we expected the activation of these systems (i.e., insula, ACC) to be particularly strong for liberals compared to conservatives. Further, work in social
psychology suggests people attend to and evaluate objects that are personally
relevant more intensely than objects that are less personally relevant (Petty
& Cacioppo, 1986), and because of this enhanced processing, we expected ideological asymmetries in evaluation of incongruent policy positions to be particularly relevant when evaluating ingroup candidates (i.e., candidates from
the individuals’ own party).
Overview of Present Work
In the present work, we used functional MRI (fMRI) to examine the impact
of incongruent information on political evaluation. We leveraged instances of
issue positions conflicting with hypothetical candidates’ party identification
as an opportunity to study how people responded to incongruent information
in the political domain, and how responses to incongruent information varied across individuals with different ideological belief systems. This investigation has direct implications for understanding how individuals respond to
candidates deviating from the party line and thus also holds implications for
understanding the psychological factors that constrain political elites’ policy positions in an increasingly polarized government. Further, by examining
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ideological asymmetries in these processes, this study provides a first step in
understanding how some political elites may experience varying degrees of
scrutiny or success for deviating from party norms. However, it is important
to note that this study is not an investigation of candidate evaluations, person
perception, or voting decisions, but rather how individuals deal with expectancy violations and incongruence more broadly within the context of politics.
We focused our inquiry on brain regions previously implicated in both attitudes and evaluative processing more generally (Cunningham et al., 2011;
Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007; Cunningham et al., 2007) and evaluation in the
political domain (Westen, Blagov, Harenski, Kilts, & Hamann, 2006)—namely
the amygdala, insular cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex. Based on prior
work in social and cognitive neuroscience (Botvinick, 2007; Carter et al., 1998;
Kolling et al., 2016), we expected the insula and ACC to be especially responsive to conflict and incongruence. The insula, specifically, should be involved
in helping integrate emotional and affective responses with an evaluative decision, especially when individuals are confronted with an expectancy violation. It is less clear whether we should expect to see differences in the amygdala in a task like this, given that the task is fairly complex and the amygdala
is thought to be activated mainly during tasks that involve quick, affective or
emotional responses. However, we nonetheless examined activation in the
amygdala because some work has suggested the function of the amygdala is to
automatically evaluate whether objects have motivational relevance, which we
expect to be the case in this task (e.g., Cunningham, Johnson, Gatenby, Gore,
& Banaji, 2003; Cunningham, Van Bavel, & Johnsen, 2008).
We measured political ideology in order to examine whether it moderated
neural responses to incongruent information for ingroup versus outgroup political candidates. Based on prior literature on psychological differences between liberals and conservatives, we expected ideology to moderate neural activation in the insula and ACC, and possibly amygdala. Specifically, functional
activation in left insula has been associated with greater liberalism during
behavioral decision-making and emotion-related tasks (Ahn et al., 2014; Schreiber et al., 2013). Other work has suggested there may be both structural and
functional differences related to ideology in ACC, such that liberals are more
likely to engage in conflict monitoring (which may be reflected in ACC activation; Amodio et al., 2007) and show larger gray matter volume in ACC (Kanai
et al., 2011). In addition, existing work has shown that conservatives showed
more activation in right amygdala during a decision-making task (Schreiber
et al., 2013). Thus, we expected incongruent policy positions to be associated
with increased activity in the ACC and insula for liberals and increased activity in the right amygdala for conservatives. However, the existing literature on
ideological differences in political neuroscience is still relatively sparse, so we
were open to alternate possibilities. Finally, based on work in social psychology on role of personal relevance in cognitive elaboration (Petty & Cacioppo,
1986), we expected these differences to be predominantly relevant for evaluations of statements by ingroup candidates.
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Method
Participants
Fifty-eight healthy adults (34 females and 24 males; age range 19–59, M =
25.4, SD = 9.2) participated in the experiment. Participants were politically
diverse, with 32 identifying as liberal and 26 identifying as conservative. Participants were recruited from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and the surrounding community. All participants were right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and no known history of neurological disorders.
Participants were safety screened to ensure eligibility for MRI and provided
informed consent in accord with study approval by the institutional review
board. They were compensated $30 USD for their participation.
Experimental Design and Stimuli
Participants came to the MRI center and participated in a rapid event-related
fMRI experiment where they evaluated the policy positions of hypothetical political candidates during MRI. Prior to the scan, participants were informed
about the order of MRI scans and received an overview of the experimental
task. Participants were instructed that they would be evaluating issue positions attributed to hypothetical political candidates, but we asked them to
think about these candidates as if they were real candidates running for office. They knew they would see a series of policy statements that each candidate either supported or opposed and that they should tell us whether that
issue position made them feel good or bad. We did not define these terms for
participants, but told them that responses were subjective and we wanted to
know what they thought. They were encouraged to focus on the issue positions
and not explicitly instructed to form an impression of the candidate. There
was no expectation that they needed to remember each candidate after the
block of trials ended (i.e., participants knew they would not be asked followup questions about the candidates themselves). They were encouraged to balance speed with accuracy in responding, but to rely on their initial response
given the limited response window.
The experiment had a 2 trial type (congruent/incongruent) × 2 block type
(ingroup/outgroup) within-subjects design.1 The experimental paradigm was
designed to manipulate incongruence as a function of the candidates’ issue positions and political party affiliation. Experimental stimuli were presented in
the scanner using E-Prime 2.0.10 (Psychology Software Tools, 2012). Prior to
the start of each block, participants received information about the political
candidate (Democrat or Republican) that they would be evaluating for that set
of trials. All participants evaluated policy positions attributed to four different
candidates (two Democrats and two Republicans) in a randomized order, and
1. We also varied task uncertainty but that is beyond the scope of the present manuscript and will not be discussed here.
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all hypothetical candidates were White males.2 Both trial order and interstimulus interval (ISI) duration were predetermined using Optseq2 [https://surfer.
nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq], a software package designed to help maximize
efficiency and ability to accurately model the hemodynamic response in rapid
event-related designs (see Burock, Buckner, Woldorff, Rosen, & Dale, 1998;
Dale, Greve, & Burock, 1999).
On each trial, participants received information about a specific policy position attributed to the candidate and information about whether the candidate
supported or opposed that issue. Next, a policy statement appeared, and participants were asked to evaluate how they (subjectively) felt about the candidate’s position on that issue by selecting either good or bad using the response
pad while in the scanner (1 = good, 2 = bad). Each trial (see Fig. 1, for example) consisted of presentation of a cue (750 ms) followed by a policy statement
(4250 ms) and a fixation cross that was on screen for each jittered interstimulus interval (ISI: 2500, 5000, 7500, 10,000, or 12,500 ms). A majority of the
issue positions (66.6%) in each block were congruent with the candidate’s political identification (as determined by behavioral pilot data), but a smaller
subset were incongruent with his identification (33.3%) to allow for examination of both congruent and incongruent issue positions. While this means
participants saw fewer incongruent trials relative to congruent trials, this was
done to increase external validity of the task, as most mainstream political
candidates tend to hold fairly consistent issue positions (e.g., Jennings, 1992).
After the MRI portion of the study, participants completed a post-scan survey where they provided additional ratings of the 96 policy statements they
saw while in the scanner. Participants rated how important each issue was
to them personally on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = not at all important to
7 = extremely important and rated their own support or opposition to each
statement on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = support completely to 7 = oppose completely.3 The order of these blocks was counterbalanced so that some
participants evaluated support first and others started with importance. Participants then responded to a series of demographic questions, including a
one-item measure of political ideology asking them to place themselves on a
continuum from 1 = very liberal to 6 = very conservative.4 The mean response
on the political ideology item was near the midpoint of the scale (M = 3.34,
SD = 1.40). This item was mean-centered for analysis.
2. The candidates themselves were not the primary focus of this experiment, so this
choice was made to minimize potential variability in candidate evaluation as a function of gender or race. Six candidate images were chosen from the Chicago Face Database (Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2015), based on gender, race, and perceived age. Four
images were randomly selected for each participant and shown in randomized order.
3. Participants also completed a number of individual difference measures after scanning, but these are beyond the scope of the current manuscript and will not be discussed in more detail here.
4. No option for “moderate” was offered in order to ensure we could discriminate between candidates that would be most likely seen as “ingroup” and “outgroup” candidates. Further, partisan “leaners” and even Independents have been shown to largely
manifest the same-party-based evaluations as partisan identifiers and tend to show
meaningful implicit preferences (Hawkins & Nosek, 2012; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015;
Keith et al., 1986; Lundberg & Payne, 2014).
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Fig. 1. Example trial from experimental task participants completed during MRI.

Policy Statements. We generated a long list of relevant policy statements
including social, economic, and foreign policy issues. Policy statements were
pilot tested using a separate sample obtained through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (N = 255). Participants in the pilot study rated their support or opposition to each of the issues, how important each issue was to them, and
whether each issue was likely to be supported more by Democrats or Republicans (all on 7-point scales). Policy statements for this experiment were selected from pilot data based on the degree to which they were clearly Democratic or Republican issues and equated as much as possible for degree of
support or opposition and issue importance. Statements were separated into
four lists to be used for randomization in E-Prime (two lists of Democratic
positions, two Republican). Participants saw each statement twice over the
course of the experiment, but issues were not seen twice for a single candidate (see Appendix for full list of stimuli).
MRI Data Acquisition
MRI data were acquired using a Siemens Skyra 3.0 Tesla MRI with a 32-channel head coil. Prior to functional imaging, a high-resolution T1-weighted 3D
anatomical image (MPRAGE; field of view (FoV) read = 256 mm, slice thickness
= 1.0 × 1.0 × 1.0 mm, repetition time (TR) = 2400 ms, echo time (TE) = 3.37
ms, inversion time (TI) = 991 ms, prescan normalize on, PAT mode GRAPPA)
was collected for spatial normalization. Functional MRI data were acquired
with acquisition parallel to the AC-PC line to maximize whole-brain coverage (42 slices, FoV read = 220 mm, slice thickness = 3.0 × 3.0 × 3.0 mm, TR
= 2500 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 80°, prescan normalize off). Participants
completed four blocks of functional scanning, lasting approximately 8.5 min
each. The first five volumes of each run were discarded to avoid variability
due to pre-steady-state functional data.
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MRI Data Preprocessing and Analysis
MRI data were preprocessed using fMRI Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT) in FMRIB Software Library (FSL; Jenkinson, Beckmann, Behrens, Woolrich, & Smith,
2012; Smith et al., 2004) on MacOS. The high-resolution 3D anatomical image (MPRAGE) was skull stripped using FSL’s Brain Extraction Function (BET;
Smith, 2002). Data from functional runs were subjected to normalization, registration to both MPRAGE and standard space (MNI152), spatial smoothing at
FWHM of 5 mm, slice timing correction (to correct for interleaved data acquisition), and motion correction using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady,
& Smith, 2002).
Analyses were conducted using the general linear model (GLM) as implemented in FSL. Time-series data were modeled at the first level (the trial level)
using FMRIB’s Improved Linear Model (FILM), and then, higher-level analysis (across sessions first, and then across subjects) was carried out using FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed Effects (FLAME; see Smith et al., 2004). First,
the blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal was modeled at the trial level
for each run as a function of trial type (congruent/incongruent). Data from
each run were then averaged across subjects using a fixed effects model. At
the subject level, we also modeled the effect of block type—whether the political candidate in each block shared the participant’s ideological identification
(ingroup candidate) or not (outgroup candidate). This allowed us to examine
whether incongruence effects differ as a function of the target of evaluation
(ingroup vs. outgroup candidate), in addition to the effects of policy information. The subject-level analyses were then combined into group-level region
of interest (ROI) analyses using FSL FLAME1. ROI analyses on left amygdala,
right amygdala, bilateral insula, and anterior cingulate cortex were masked
prior to analysis (using anatomical masks from the Harvard–Oxford Cortical/Subcortical Atlases provided with FSL) and cluster corrected to correct
for multiple comparisons. In FSL, a Z-statistic>2.0 was used to define contiguous clusters, and then, cluster probabilities were compared to the (corrected) cluster significance threshold of p < .05 using Gaussian random field
theory (Worsley, 2001).
In order to plot the BOLD activation related to political ideology, cluster
masks were created using fslmaths for each significant cluster of activation,
and mean activation to trial type as a function of block type (i.e., incongruent
outgroup, incongruent ingroup, congruent outgroup, congruent ingroup) was
extracted using these cluster masks in FEATQuery.

Results
Behavioral Task Data
First, we examined the data from the behavioral task participants completed
while in the scanner. A repeated-measures ANOVA was used to examine response latency as a function of trial type (congruent/incongruent), evaluative
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response (good/bad), and block type (ingroup/outgroup candidate). Overall,
participants were significantly faster to respond on congruent (M = 2553 ms,
SD = 741 ms) versus incongruent trials (M = 2631 ms, SD = 726 ms; F(1,51) =
33.14, p < .001). Responses were also significantly faster when participants
selected the good (M = 2546 ms, SD = 742) versus bad (M = 2613 ms, SD = 730
ms) response option (F(1,52) = 11.96, p = .001); however, it is worth noting
here that participants always selected the good option with their index finger.
There was no overall main effect of response latency for block type (ingroup/
outgroup candidate). Looking at interaction effects among trial type (congruent/incongruent), response (good/bad), and block type (ingroup/outgroup)
revealed a significant interaction of response with block type (F(1,56) = 9.19,
p = .004) and a significant three-way interaction with trial type (F(1,57) =
22.09, p < .001). Overall, participants were faster to respond good (M = 2437,
SD = 754) than bad (M = 2712, SD = 695) on congruent ingroup trials and on
incongruent outgroup trials (good: M = 2570, SD = 727; bad: M = 2683, SD =
768). Participants were faster to respond bad than good for both incongruent ingroup trials (bad: M = 2609, SD = 707; good: M = 2715, SD = 700) and
congruent outgroup trials (bad: M = 2535, SD = 740; good: M = 2626, SD =
727), although these differences were smaller. These results show that as expected, individuals were faster to respond good when their ingroup stated a
position consistent with their party affiliation or when the outgroup stated a
position incongruent with their party affiliation, and vice versa with regard
to responding bad.
Next, we ran a similar repeated-measures ANOVA model adding mean-centered political ideology as a between-subjects factor, with trial type, evaluative
response, and block type all modeled as within-subjects factors. This model
again showed a significant three-way interaction of trial type, response, and
block type, but this was qualified by a four-way interaction including political
ideology (F(1,55) = 12.03, p = .001). This interaction suggests that political ideology moderated the effects of trial type, response, and block type on response
latency. In order to interpret this interaction effect, we dichotomized the ideology variable (1–3 = liberal, 4–6 = conservative) and re-ran the model described in the above paragraph separately for both liberals and conservatives.
For liberal participants, there were significant main effects of trial type
(F(1,25) = 29.04, p < .001) and evaluative response (F(1,27) = 8.55, p = .007)
on response latency. Liberals also showed a significant interaction of block
type with response (F(1,30) = 12.86, p = .001) and a significant three-way interaction with trial type (F(1,31) = 34.27, p < .001). All other effects for liberals were not statistically significant. For conservative participants, there
were significant main effects of trial type (F(1,22) = 6.47, p = .020) and response (F(1,20) = 5.28, p = .033). None of the interaction effects were statistically significant for conservatives. Figure 2 shows mean response latency
as a function of political ideology. Overall, the biggest difference is that response latency for liberal participants varied more as a function of trial type
than it did for conservative participants. Liberal participants, for example,
were quicker to respond good (M = 2398, SD = 767) versus bad (M = 2841, SD
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Fig. 2. Response latency (milliseconds) as a function of trial type (congruent/incongruent), evaluative response (good/bad), block type (ingroup/outgroup), and political ideology (1 = liberal, 6 = conservative).

= 711) on congruent ingroup trials. Conservative participants show the same
pattern (good: M = 2509, SD = 728; bad: M = 2637, SD = 678) for congruent
ingroup trials, but not to the same degree. Overall, response latency for liberals varied more as a function of trial type, response, and block type. In other
words, conservatives were less likely to exhibit qualifications in the timing
of their responses based on congruence and party affiliation of the candidate.
Finally, we examined descriptive data for the number of trials on which
participants responded good versus bad as a function of trial type, block type,
and political ideology (see Fig. 3). Consistent with the variation in response latency, we can see that liberals appeared to be modifying their responses more
in relation to trial type and block type. For example, they were more likely
to judge consistent ingroup trials as good versus bad, whereas conservatives
showed more of a 50–50 split.
fMRI Data
Blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal was modeled as a function of
trial type (congruent/incongruent) and block type (ingroup/outgroup candidate). ROI analyses revealed significant clusters of activation in anterior cingulate, insula, and amygdala that will be detailed below (see Table 1 for full
list of significant clusters).
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Fig. 3. Evaluative response (good/bad) as a function of trial type (congruent/incongruent), block type (ingroup/outgroup), and political ideology (1 = liberal, 6 = conservative).

Main Effect of Incongruent > Congruent Trials
First, we examined the main effect of incongruence by examining directional
contrasts designed to compare differences in BOLD activation between incongruent and congruent trials. Region of interest analyses revealed significant clusters of activation in anterior cingulate, insula, and amygdala for
incongruent>congruent trials (see Fig. 4). Consistent with the view that ACC is
involved in processing incongruent information, we saw a large cluster of activation in dorsal ACC and paracingulate in response to incongruent>congruent
trials (see Fig. 4a; 2354 voxels, Z-max = 4.51, p < .001; MNI Coordinates: X =
–4, Y = –14, Z = 50). The same contrast (incongruent>congruent) also showed
bilateral activation in insula and lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; see Fig. 4b),
with a larger cluster of voxels on the right (441 voxels, Z-max = 3.84, p = .005;
MNI coordinates: X = 32, Y = 28, Z = –2) than the left (252 voxels, Z-max =
3.33, p = .042; MNI coordinates: X = –26, Y = 22, Z = –8). Finally, there was
a significant cluster in right amygdala active for the incongruent>congruent
contrast (see Fig. 4c; 213 voxels, Z-max = 3.47, p = .018; MNI coordinates: X =
32, Y = –2, Z = –28). No significant activation was observed in left amygdala.
We also examined the reverse contrast to see whether any of these ROIs
showed greater activation to congruent versus incongruent trials. No significant clusters of activation were shown. We modeled whether neural processing of incongruence differed when participants were evaluating ingroup versus outgroup candidates and again, there were no overall main effects of block
type emerged in these ROIs.

Anterior cingulate gyrus;
paracingulate gyrus

Insular cortex; lateral
orbitofrontal cortex

Insular cortex; lateral
orbitofrontal cortex

Amygdala

Anterior cingulate gyrus;
paracingulate gyrus

Insular cortex; lateral
orbitofrontal cortex

Incongruent>congruent

Incongruent>congruent

Incongruent>congruent

Incongruent>congruent

Trial type × block type
× political ideology

Trial type × block type
× political ideology

Left

–

Right

Left

Right

–

Contrast
Anatomical label(s)
Side
			

428

1413

213

252

441

2354

Cluster
size

.009

.001

.018

.042

.005

<.001

p value

3.49

3.76

3.47

3.33

3.84

4.51

Peak activation
(Z score)

–44

10

32

–26

32

–4

X

22

46

–2

22

28

–14

Y

–6

12

–28

–8

–2

50

Z

Table 1. Significant clusters of BOLD activation in ROIs for main effects and interactions of trial type (congruent/incongruent), block type (ingroup/outgroup), and
political ideology. X,Y, Z coordinates are in MNI152 space.
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Fig. 4. BOLD activation in ACC,
bilateral insula, and right amygdala
in response to incongruent>congruent
trials. Images were created by
overlaying the thresholded Z-statistic
image on a standard space template
(MNI152). Images are centered on the
peak voxel for each cluster from the
ROI analyses in: a. anterior cingulate,
b. insula, c. right amygdala.

Moderation by Political Ideology
Next, we added self-reported political ideology (mean centered) to the grouplevel analysis in FSL as a continuous covariate to examine whether ideology
moderated responses to incongruent versus congruent trials, and whether
that response differed for ingroup versus outgroup candidates. Ideology did
not have a significant influence on overall responses to incongruent versus
congruent trials, but we did observe significant clusters in ACC and insula for
the ingroup>outgroup contrast, suggesting that ideology had an impact on the
degree to which these ROIs were responding to incongruent versus congruent
issue positions from ingroup versus outgroup candidates (see Fig. 5). We did
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Fig. 5. BOLD activation in response to the interaction of trial type (incongruent>
congruent), block type (ingroup>outgroup), and political ideology (liberal>conservative)
in a. anterior cingulate cortex and b. left insula. Images were created by overlaying the
thresholded Z-statistic image on a standard space template (MNI152). Plots represent
mean parameter estimates by condition extracted from functional clusters.

not find any significant clusters of activation in relation to political ideology
in left or right amygdala.
There was a significant cluster of activation for the interaction of trial type
(incongruent>congruent), block type (ingroup>outgroup), and political ideology (liberal>conservative) in the ACC (see Fig. 5a; 1413 voxels, Z-max = 3.76,
p < .001; MNI coordinates: X = 10, Y = 46, Z = 12). As shown in the scatterplot
in Fig. 5a, ACC activation to incongruence from ingroup versus outgroup candidates showed a negative relationship with political ideology. In other words,
more liberal participants showed greater activation in ACC to incongruent
versus congruent trials for ingroup (Democratic) candidates, whereas more
conservative participants showed greater ACC activation to incongruent versus congruent trials for outgroup (Democratic) candidates. This is consistent
with the behavioral data described above, where we observed liberal participants showed greater variability in both response latency and evaluative response for ingroup candidates—consistent with the view that they were more
responsive to incongruence on those trials and perhaps more likely to engage
in cognitive elaboration for incongruent trials, slowing their response time.
The same pattern emerged in a region of left insula (see Fig. 5b; 428 voxels, Z-max = 3.49, p = .009; MNI coordinates: X = –44, Y = 22, Z = –6). More
liberal participants showed greater activation in left insula in response to
incongruent versus congruent trials for ingroup candidates, whereas more
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conservative participants showed greater activation in left insula in response
to incongruent versus congruent trials for outgroup candidates.

Discussion
In sum, this experiment provides some initial evidence that neural processing
of political issue positions differs as a function of both incongruence and group
status, and these effects vary across political ideology. We observed neural activation in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), insula, and amygdala in relation
to incongruent versus congruent trials. Activation in both ACC and insula was
moderated by group status (whether participants were evaluating an ingroup
versus outgroup political candidate) and participants’ political ideology. Liberal participants were more likely to show greater activation in ACC and insula in response to incongruent versus congruent trials, namely when political
candidates were ingroup members. Liberal participants were also more likely
than conservative participants to base their evaluative decisions on whether
or not information was incongruent, and showed more evidence for differentiation in terms of response latency. Relative to more conservative participants, liberal participants were more likely to rate congruent ingroup trials
as good (vs. bad) and incongruent ingroup trials as bad (vs. good), and they
were slower to respond when deviating from this response pattern.
There is an extant literature in political science on how individuals process political information and political candidates, yet an understanding of the
psychological mechanisms by which people make political evaluations is far
from complete, and an understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying
political evaluations is in its infancy. The primary implication of the findings
presented here is that people may be more likely to attend to incongruent issue positions for same-party candidates, but that liberals are more likely to do
this relative to conservatives. This is consistent with prior literature arguing
that liberals are more likely to detect and process conflict relative to conservatives (Amodio et al., 2007), as well as prior fMRI work that has shown differences in neural processing between liberals and conservatives in these regions during emotion-related or decision-making tasks (e.g., Ahn et al., 2014;
Schreiber et al., 2013). It is also consistent with prior work showing that people tend to engage in additional processing in regions such as medial prefrontal cortex for incongruent social targets (Cloutier et al., 2011; Hehman et al.,
2014), but shows that this can be extended to regions involved in evaluative
processing and conflict detection more generally (i.e., insula, ACC) and that
processing is influenced by both political ideology and by group membership
in the political domain.
One limitation of the present work is that we relied on hypothetical political candidates to present information to participants. While this allowed
for greater experimental control, it may limit the extent to which the results
generalize to evaluation of real-life political figures, given that real life is often much more complicated. There were no personally meaningful outcomes
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associated with the task participants completed in this study, so it is possible
that our liberal participants were more motivated to engage processing incongruence in the task, but perhaps conservative participants would be more
likely to do so under other conditions. Future work might explore the moderating (or mediating) role of other variables that may impact the degree to
which people engage in cognitive elaboration about incongruent political information, such as political knowledge or the Need for Cognition (Cacioppo &
Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996).
The implications of these findings for democratic representation are substantial. Government has become increasingly polarized for a number of reasons, including institutional design pressures and pressures for parties to “toe
the party line” (i.e., constrain their policy positions to those that fit strictly
within the party platform) in order to gain support among their base (Dalton, 2008; Masket, 2009; Sinclair, 2006; Theriault, 2008). Citizens have often lamented such polarization as alienating broad swaths of the more politically moderate electorate, but as this study suggests, how individuals process
elites’ congruent versus incongruent policy positions may also provide a constraint on the ability of politicians to stray from the party line. The results of
this study suggest that when individuals evaluate the policy positions of their
party’s candidates, deviations from party stereotypes are likely to receive additional processing and be labeled as “bad” compared to policy positions that
fit party stereotypes. These findings may be concerning to those who see political polarization as a problem as well as to those who desire meaningful
social change, as they demonstrate the psychological processes that help to
hinder the likelihood of political compromise, which is necessary for translating desired policy into implemented policy given the divided nature of government in the USA.
Further, the observed ideological asymmetries in evaluative processing of
incongruent policy positions suggest the electorate may be more likely to scrutinize incongruence coming from Democratic candidates and politicians compared to Republicans. Activation in ACC and insula does not, however, necessarily indicate punishment of incongruent policy positions among Democrats.
For example, it is possible that activity in these brain regions would also be
observed for attempts to reconcile incongruence with party loyalties or engage
in motivated reasoning. However, the behavioral results regarding evaluative
decisions and response latency suggest liberals are more likely to see incongruence among Democrats as negative. This does not mean there are not situations under which Republican elites are scrutinized for holding incongruent issue positions, but this may be the exception rather than the rule. The
ideological asymmetries in our results have some interesting implications. In
terms of resistance to compromise, it may be Democrats rather than Republicans who face the greatest scrutiny by constituents for deviating from partybased expectations. If less scrutiny is applied to Republicans for policy deviations, it may indicate that specific liberal causes and policies have some
electoral viability among Republican candidates. In other words, Republican
candidates and representatives may be allowed to adopt liberal stances on
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some subset of issues without facing scrutiny from their Republican constituents. This is speculative, however, and may be dependent on the extent to
which these policy deviations are highlighted for voters by third parties such
as the media or interest groups.
This implication may seem odd given other empirical findings that suggest, for example, that political conservatives are less open-minded (Mondak,
2010) and less tolerant of ambiguity (Jost et al., 2003, 2007) relative to liberals, and that elite polarization over the past few decades has been driven predominantly by shifts among Republican elites toward increasingly conservative
policy positions (McCarty et al., 2006). There could be multiple explanations
for this apparent discrepancy. For example, it may be the case that whereas
liberals respond more to ideological inconsistency within Democratic candidates and representatives, conservatives respond more simply to group dynamics such as party affiliation and loyalty (i.e., whether the candidate or representative is viewed as a dedicated member of their ingroup). Alternatively,
some work points to increasing fractionalization among Republican elites and
members of the public—that is, the development of distinct clusters and coalitions within the Republican Party, each with particular sets of issues on which
they are extreme (see Hare & Poole, 2014). Contemporary political disagreement among Republican elites regarding health insurance, social issues, and
foreign policy supports this proposition. If this is true, it could suggest that
the Republican platform is significantly fractured to the degree that conservative members of the public have a difficult time identifying policy positions
that are incongruent. In other words, the ideological differences we observed
here could be context-dependent. Future research should continue to examine ideological asymmetries in responses to incongruent policy positions and
the extent to which these differences may shift over time.
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Appendix
Policy Statements

Democratic Statements
Banning the death penalty
Requiring guns be locked in a safe
Government insurance covering all medical costs
Legalization of medical marijuana
Teaching evolution
A path to US citizenship for illegal immigrants
Legalizing same-sex marriage
Sex education in schools
Requiring body cameras on police officers
Harsher punishment for police use of excessive force
Allowing cyclists to use public streets
Same-sex civil unions
Waiting periods for gun purchase
Government regulation of business
Mandatory recycling
Expanding Medicaid
Federal government action to reduce unemployment
Automatic citizenship for immigrants
Restricting the death penalty
A ban on semiautomatic weapons
Maintaining the legal right to abortion
Raising the federal minimum wage
Federal government action on global warming
Diplomatic solution with ISIS in Iraq
Government benefits for low-income families
Economic incentives for businesses reducing pollution
Requiring background checks to buy guns
Requiring United Nations approval for US military action
USA aid to Africa to help fight Ebola
Increased racial diversity in police departments
Decreasing defense spending
Granting amnesty to some immigrants
Lighter prison sentences for victimless crimes
A ban on religious symbols in schools
The right to have an abortion
Physician-assisted suicide
Legalizing marijuana 	 

(continued)
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Universal health care
Limitations on gun ownership
Government regulation of pollution
Allowing gay people to adopt
Legalizing prostitution
Higher taxes for the top 1%
Withdrawing troops from Iraq and Afghanistan
Government funding for stem-cell research
A ban on school prayer
Euthanasia for terminally ill patients
Decreasing the size of the army

Republican Statements
Sending troops to fight ISIS
Invading Iran
A ban on travel from West Africa to prevent spreading Ebola
Punishing women who drink or use drugs during pregnancy
The war on drugs
Fracking (injecting liquid into rocks to extract oil and gas)
The use of military attack drones
Decreasing government services
The death penalty
Capital punishment
The right of citizens to own guns
Allowing illegal immigrants to work only low paying jobs
Mandatory military service in the USA
Outlawing abortion
Eliminating Medicare
Allowing abortion only in cases of rape or incest
Allowing high school students to have guns
A ban on gay couples from adopting children
Requiring parental consent for teen abortions
Racial profiling under some circumstances
Loosening restrictions on gun ownership
Sending illegal immigrants to work camps
Privatization of health insurance
Racial profiling of African Americans
School prayer
A ban on sex and violence from television
Protecting all gun ownership
Posting the 10 Commandments in every classroom
Privatization of social security

(continued)
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Decreased regulation of business
Government access to private email to fight terrorism
Deportation of unaccompanied minors
Laws requiring voter identification
Restrictions on immigration
A ban on affirmative action
A ban on same-sex marriage
Time limits on welfare benefits
Killing anyone who joins ISIS
Intervening in the Israel–Palestine conflict
Dismantling the welfare program
Deportation of all illegal immigrants
Expanding the use of the death penalty
Increasing defense spending
A ban on environmental regulations
Establishing English as the official language
Legalizing carrying concealed weapons
Suspending civil liberties to fight terrorism
Abstinence-only sex education

References
Ahn, W.-Y., Kishida, Kenneth T., Gu, X., Lohrenz, T., Harvey, A., Alford, John R., et al.
(2014). Nonpolitical images evoke neural predictors of political ideology. Current Biology, 24, 1–7. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2014.09.050
Amodio, D. M., Jost, J. T., Master, S. L., & Yee, C. M. (2007). Neurocognitive correlates of
liberalism and conservatism. Nature Neuroscience, 10, 1246–1247.
Arceneaux, K. (2008). Do partisan cues diminish democratic accountability? Political
Behavior, 30(2), 139–160.
Atieh, J. M., Brief, A. P., & Vollrath, D. A. (1987). The Protestant work ethic-conservatism paradox: Beliefs and values in work and life. Personality and Individual Differences, 8(4), 577–580.
Binder, S. A. (2003). Stalemate: Causes and consequences of legislative gridlock. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Botvinick, M. M. (2007). Conflict monitoring and decision making: Reconciling two perspectives on anterior cingulate function. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 7(4), 356–366.
Burock, M. A., Buckner, R. L., Woldorff, M. G., Rosen, B. R., & Dale, A. M. (1998). Randomized event-related experimental designs allow for extremely rapid presentation
rates using functional MRI. NeuroReport, 9(16), 3735–3739.
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 42, 116–131.
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., Feinstein, J. A., & Jarvis, W. B. G. (1996). Dispositional differences in cognitive motivation: The life and times of individuals varying in need
for cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 197–253.

24

Haas, Baker, & Gonzalez in Social Justice Research (2017)

Carter, C. S., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Botvinick, M. M., Noll, D., & Cohen, J. D. (1998).
Anterior cingulate cortex, error detection, and the online monitoring of performance.
Science, 280, 747–749.
Chirumbolo, A., Areni, A., & Sensales, G. (2004). Need for cognitive closure and politics: Voting, political attitudes, and attributional style. International Journal of Psychology, 39(4), 245–253.
Cloutier, J., Gabrieli, J. D., O’Young, D., & Ambady, N. (2011). An fMRI study of violations
of social expectations: When people are not who we expect them to be. NeuroImage,
57(2), 583–588. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.04.051
Cohen, G. L. (2003). Party over policy: The dominating impact of group influence on political beliefs. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 808–822.
Cunningham, W. A., Haas, I. J., & Jahn, A. (2011). Attitudes. In J. Decety & J. T. Cacioppo
(Eds.), The Oxford handbook of social neuroscience (pp. 212–226). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Cunningham, W. A., Johnson, M. K., Gatenby, J. C., Gore, J. C., & Banaji, M. R. (2003).
Neural components of social evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 639–649.
Cunningham, W. A., Van Bavel, J. J., & Johnsen, I. R. (2008). Affective flexibility: Evaluative processing goals shape amygdala activity. Psychological Science, 19, 152–160.
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02061.x
Cunningham, W. A., & Zelazo, P. D. (2007). Attitudes and evaluations: A social cognitive
neuroscience perspective. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11, 97–104.
Cunningham, W. A., Zelazo, P. D., Packer, D. J., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2007). The iterative reprocessing model: A multilevel framework for attitudes and evaluation. Social Cognition, 25, 736–760.
Dale, A. M., Greve, D. N., & Burock, M. A. (1999). Optimal stimulus sequences for eventrelated fMRI. NeuroImage, 9, S33–S33.
Dalton, R. J. (2008). The quantity and the quality of party systems party system polarization, its measurement, and its consequences. Comparative Political Studies,
41(7), 899–920.
Dancey, L., & Sheagley, G. (2013). Heuristics behaving badly: Party cues and voter knowledge. American Journal of Political Science, 57(2), 312–325.
Edwards, G. C., III, Barrett, A., & Peake, J. (1997). The legislative impact of divided government. American Journal of Political Science, 41(2), 545–563.
Fay, D., & Frese, M. (2000). Conservatives’ approach to work: Less prepared for future
work demands? Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30(1), 171–195.
Fazio, R. H. (2007). Attitudes as object-evaluation associations of varying strength. Social Cognition, 25, 603–637.
Gillies, J., & Campbell, S. (1985). Conservatism and poetry preferences. British Journal
of Social Psychology, 24(3), 223–227.
Golec, A., & Federico, C. M. (2004). Understanding responses to political conflict: Interactive effects of the need for closure and salient conflict schemas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 750–762.
Green, D., Palmquist, B., & Schickler, E. (2002). Partisan hearts and minds. New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press.
Greene, S. (1999). Understanding party identification: A social identity approach. Political Psychology, 20(2), 393–403.

W h o C a n D e v i at e f r o m t h e Pa r t y L i n e ?

25

Gu, X., Liu, X., Van Dam, N. T., Hof, P. R., & Fan, J. (2013). Cognition–emotion integration in the anterior insular cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 23(1), 20–27. doi: 10.1093/
cercor/bhr367
Haas, I. J. (2016). The impact of uncertainty, threat, and political identity on support for
political compromise. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 38(3), 137–152.
Hare, C., & Poole, K. T. (2014). The polarization of contemporary American politics. Polity, 46(3), 411–429.
Hawkins, C. B., & Nosek, B. A. (2012). Motivated independence? Implicit party identity predicts political judgments among self-proclaimed independents. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38(11), 1437–1452. doi: 10.1177/0146167212452313
Hehman, E., Ingbretsen, Z. A., & Freeman, J. B. (2014). The neural basis of stereotypic
impact on multiple social categorization. NeuroImage, 101, 704–711. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2014.07.056
Hibbing, J. R., & Theiss-Morse, E. (2002). Stealth democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Hilton, J. L., & von Hippel, W. (1996). Stereotypes. Annual Review of Psychology, 47,
237–271.
Huddy, L., Mason, L., & Aarøe, L. (2015). Expressive partisanship: Campaign involvement, political emotion, and partisan identity. American Political Science Review,
109(01), 1–17. doi: 10.1017/s0003055414000604
Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2015). Fear and loathing across party lines: New evidence on group polarization. American Journal of Political Science, 59(3), 690–707.
doi: 10.1111/ajps.12152
Jenkinson, M., Bannister, P., Brady, M., & Smith, S. (2002). Improved optimisation for
the robust and accurate linear registration and motion correction of brain images.
NeuroImage, 17, 825–841.
Jenkinson, M., Beckmann, C. F., Behrens, T. E., Woolrich, M. W., & Smith, S. M. (2012).
FSL. NeuroImage, 62, 782–790.
Jennings, M. K. (1992). Ideological thinking among mass publics and political elites. Public Opinion Quarterly, 56(4), 419–441.
Jones, J. M. (2014). Americans continue to say a third political party is needed. Gallup.
http://www.gallup.com/poll/177284/americans-continue-say-third-political-partyneeded.aspx
Jost, J. T., & Amodio, D. M. (2012). Political ideology as motivated social cognition: Behavioral and neuroscientific evidence. Motivation and Emotion, 36(1), 55–64. doi:
10.1007/s11031-011-9260-7
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as
motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 339–375.
Jost, J. T., Napier, J. L., Thorisdottir, H., Gosling, S. D., Palfai, T. P., & Ostafin, B. (2007).
Are needs to manage uncertainty and threat associated with political conservatism
or ideological extremity? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 989–1007.
Kanai, R., Feilden, T., Firth, C., & Rees, G. (2011). Political orientations are correlated
with brain structure in young adults. Current Biology, 21(8), 677–680. doi: 10.1016/j.
cub.2011.03.017
Kaplan, J. T., Freedman, J., & Iacoboni, M. (2007). Us versus them: Political attitudes
and party affiliation influence neural responses to faces of presidential candidates.
Neuropsychologia, 45, 55–64.

26

Haas, Baker, & Gonzalez in Social Justice Research (2017)

Keith, B. E., Magleby, D. B., Nelson, C. J., Orr, E., Westlye, M. C., & Wolfinger, R. E.
(1986). The partisan affinities of independent ‘leaners’. British Journal of Political
Science, 16(2), 155–185.
Kemmelmeier, M. (2007). Political conservatism, rigidity, and dogmatism in American
foreign policy officials: The 1966 Mennis data. Journal of Psychology, 141(1), 77–90.
Kolling, N., Behrens, T., Wittmann, M. K., & Rushworth, M. (2016). Multiple signals in
anterior cingulate cortex. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 37, 36–43. doi: 10.1016/j.
conb.2015.12.007
Lau, R. R., & Redlawsk, D. P. (2001). Advantages and disadvantages of cognitive heuristics in political decision making. American Journal of Political Science, 45, 951–971.
Leone, L., & Chirumbolo, A. (2008). Conservatism as motivated avoidance of affect:
Need for affect scales predict conservatism measures. Journal of Research in Personality, 42(3), 755–762.
Lundberg, K. B., & Payne, B. K. (2014). Decisions among the undecided: Implicit attitudes predict future voting behavior of undecided voters. PLoS ONE, 9(1), e85680.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0085680
Ma, D. S., Correll, J., & Wittenbrink, B. (2015). The Chicago face database: A free stimulus set of faces and norming data. Behavior Research Methods, 47(4), 1122–1135. doi:
10.3758/s13428-014-0532-5
Malhotra, N., & Kuo, A. G. (2008). Attributing blame: The public’s response to Hurricane Katrina. The Journal of Politics, 70(1), 120–135.
Masket, S. (2009). No middle ground: How informal party organizations control nominations and polarize legislatures. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
McCarty, N., Poole, K. T., & Rosenthal, H. (2006). Polarized America: The dance of political ideology and unequal riches. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Medford, N., & Critchley, H. D. (2010). Conjoint activity of anterior insular and anterior
cingulate cortex: Awareness and response. Brain Structure and Function, 214(5–6),
535–549. doi: 10.1007/s00429-010-0265-x.
Mitchell, J. P., Macrae, C. N., & Banaji, M. R. (2006). Dissociable medial prefrontal contributions to judgments of similar and dissimilar others. Neuron, 50, 655–663.
Mondak, J. J. (2010). Personality and the foundations of political behavior. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Mondak, J., & Mitchell, D.-G. (2008). Fault lines: Why the Republicans lost Congress.
New York, NY: Routledge.
Nam, H. H., Jost, J. T., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2013). “Not for all the tea in China!” Political ideology and the avoidance of dissonance-arousing situations. PLoS ONE, 8(4), e59837.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0059837
Nicholson, S. P. (2011). Dominating cues and the limits of elite influence. The Journal of
Politics, 73(4), 1165–1177.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In
L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Communication and persuasion: Central and peripheral routes to
attitude change (Vol. 19, pp. 123–205). New York: Academic Press.
Pew Researc h Center. (2015). Beyond distr ust: How Amer icans view
t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t . h t t p : / / w w w. p e o p l e - p r e s s . o r g / 2 0 1 5 / 1 1 / 2 3 /
beyond-distrust-how-americans-view-their-government/
Psychology Software Tools Inc. (2012). E-Prime 2.0. Retrieved from http://www.pstnet.com

W h o C a n D e v i at e f r o m t h e Pa r t y L i n e ?

27

Rahn, W. M. (1993). The role of partisan stereotypes in information processing about
political candidates. American Journal of Political Science, 37, 472–496.
Schreiber, D., Fonzo, G., Simmons, A. N., Dawes, C. T., Flagan, T., Fowler, J. H., et al.
(2013). Red brain, blue brain: Evaluative processes differ in Democrats and Republicans. PLoS ONE, 8(2), e52970. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0052970
Sinclair, B. (2006). Party wars. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Smith, S. M. (2002). Fast robust automated brain extraction. Human Brain Mapping, 17,
143–155. doi: 10.1002/hbm.10062
Smith, S. M., Jaenkinson, M., Woolrich, M. W., Beckmann, C. F., Behrens, T. E. J., Johansen-Berg, H., et al. (2004). Advances in functional and structural MR image
analysis and implementation as FSL. NeuroImage, 23, S208–S219. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2004.07.051
Spezio, M. L., Rangel, A., Alvarez, R. M., O’Doherty, J. P., Mattes, K., Todorov, A., et al.
(2008). A neural basis for the effect of candidate appearance on election outcomes.
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 3(4), 344–352. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsn040
Theriault, S. M. (2008). Party polarization in congress. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Tusche, A., Kahnt, T., Wisniewski, D., & Haynes, J. D. (2013). Automatic processing of
political preferences in the human brain. NeuroImage, 72, 174–182. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2013.01.020
Uddin, L. Q. (2015). Salience processing and insular cortical function and dysfunction.
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 16(1), 55–61. doi: 10.1038/nrn3857
Westen, D., Blagov, P. S., Harenski, K., Kilts, C., & Hamann, S. (2006). Neural bases of
motivated reasoning: An fMRI study of emotional constraints on partisan political
judgment in the 2004 U.S. presidential election. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience,
18, 1947–1958.
Worsley, K. J. (2001). Statistical analysis of activation images. In P. Jezzard, P. M. Matthews, & S. M. Smith (Eds.), Functional MRI: An introduction to methods. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Zavala, D., Golec, A., Cislak, A., & Wesolowska, E. (2010). Political conservatism, need
for cognitive closure, and intergroup hostility. Political Psychology, 31(4), 521–541.

